BABANGIDA - HIS LIFE AND TIMES (PART 4)

Part One: http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/articles/max-siollun/babangida-the-early-years-of-the-evil-genius-pa-2.html

Part Two: http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/articles/max-siollun/babangida-the-life-and-times-of-the-evil-genius-part-2-coup-bai.html

Part 3: http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/articles/max-siollun/babangida-his-life-and-times-part-3-the-return-of-the-mili-2.html

THE BABANGIDA COUP

On the evening of August 26^th 1985, Buhari was joined in his residence by Majors Abubakar Dangiwa Umar (a Harvard University educated officer born into an aristocratic northern family who was also the former ADC to former Chief of Army Staff Hassan Usman Katsina), Lawan Gwadabe, Abdulmumuni Aminu and Sambo Dasuki. Dasuki is the son of former Sultan of Sokoto Ibrahim Dasuki. After the five men watched the evening news, the Majors arrested Buhari at gunpoint. After the coup, Buhari was detained for more than two years, badly affecting his family life and causing him to divorce his wife Safinatu upon his release.

At 6am on Tuesday August 27, 1985 Brigadier Joshua Dogonyaro announced in a nationwide broadcast that Buhari had been overthrown in a bloodless military coup. After having a champagne breakfast to toast their success, the plotters’ inner caucus held a meeting at Bonny Camp to flesh out details of the new leadership. The meeting was attended by the following officers who arrived dressed in combat fatigues: Babangida, Maj-Gen Sani Abacha, Brigadier Joshua Dogonyaro, Brigadier Aliyu Mohammed (head of military intelligence), Navy Commander Murtala Nyako**, Lt-Col Ahmed Abdullahi (Minister of Communications), Lt-Col Tanko Ayuba (commanding officer - Nigerian army signal corps), Lt-Col John Shagaya*** (commanding officer - 9th mechanised brigade, Ikeja)*, Lt-Col Anthony Ukpo, Major Abubakar Umar (Administrator of the Federal Housing Authority).

*The 9th mechanised brigade was formerly commanded by Sani Abacha.

** Currently the Governor of Adamawa State.

*** Currently PDP Senator for Plateau North.

Nigerians were kept in the dark about the new leader until Maj-Gen Sani Abacha made a follow up broadcast at 3.30pm to announce that Babangida had been appointed the new leader. Babangida said he was unanimously chosen to lead by the new caucus without any disagreement. After Abacha’s broadcast a press briefing was held with over 100 journalists. Babangida’s old classmate Vatsa was in Saudi Arabia when Babangida took over. When he returned to Nigeria, he went to pledge his loyalty to Babangida. Now that his course mate was Head of State, Vatsa again assumed he had reached the end of the road and submitted his letter of retirement. Babangida rejected his retirement and retained him as Minister of the Federal Capital Territory.

“PRESIDENT” BABANGIDA

Although it was little analysed at the time, Babangida became the first Nigerian military leader to refer to himself as “President”. Previous military leaders used the benign appellation “Head of State”. According to Babangida’s press secretary Major Debo Bashorun, the decision to call Babangida “President” was taken on the spur of the moment as Babangida was in a car en route to broadcast his inaugural speech. According to Bashorun:

“The coup itself was not a nationalistic one. He was trying to protect his interests by protecting Aliyu Mohammed who later became Chief of Army Staff, among other things……I drafted his first broadcast speech, and contrary to what has been said in some quarters, I believed the idea of calling himself President came to him on our way to NTA. It was unexpected. He altered the word Head of State to president in the car. We even forgot the Coat of Arms needed in the background at NTA. I had to go back to Dodan Barracks to bring it. With us at NTA that morning were Halilu Akilu, John Shagaya and Joshua Dogonyaro” (The News, January 24, 1994)

Whatever the origins of the decision to use the title “President”, Babangida acquired for himself, the sweeping powers of an executive president as stipulated in Nigeria’s 1979 constitution. The title “President” was not merely ceremonial. Babangida immediately acquired, and was not shy about exercising greater powers than any of his military predecessors. He reserved for himself, the unilateral right to appoint the Chief of General Staff, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the heads of the army, navy and air force, and the Inspector-General of Police. These appointments were previously made collectively by senior members of military regimes.

NEW GOVERNING ORGANS

The Supreme Military Council (SMC) was renamed the “Armed Forces Ruling Council” (AFRC), and had the following members:

ARMED FORCES RULING COUNCIL - SEPTEMBER 1985

	NAME	POSITION
1	Major-General Ibrahim Babangida	President Chairman of the Armed Forces Ruling Council Chairman of the Federal Executive Council Commander in Chief - Nigerian Armed Forces
2	Commodore Ebitu Ukiwe	Chief of General Staff
3	Major-General Domkat Bali	Defence Secretary
4	Maj-Gen Sani Abacha	Chief of Army Staff
5	Air Vice Marshal Ibrahim Mahmud Alfa	Chief of Air Staff
6	Rear-Admiral Augustus Aikhomu	Chief of Naval Staff
7	Major-General Mamman Jiya Vatsa	Minister of the Federal Capital Territory
8	Etim Inyang	Inspector-General of Police
9	Brigadier Peter Adomokhai	GOC, 1 Mechanised Infantry Division - Kaduna
10	Brigadier Yohanna Yerima Kure	GOC, 2 Mechanised Division - Ibadan
11	Brigadier Joshua Nimyel Dogonyaro	GOC, 3 Armoured Infantry Division - Jos
12	Brigadier Donaldson Oladipo Diya	GOC, 82 Division - Enugu
13	Brigadier Gado Nasko	Commander - Nigerian Army Corps of Artillery
14	Brigadier Duro Ajayi	Commander, Training and Doctrine Command
15	Brigadier Paul Omu	Commandant, Command and Staff College
16	Brigadier Ola Oni	Director - Joint Services
17	Brigadier Abdullahi Mamman	Director of Army Training and Operations
18	Commodore Aloko	Flag Officer Commanding, Eastern Naval Command
19	Commodore Murtala Nyako	Flag Officer Commanding, Western Naval Command
20	Commodore Mauftau Adegoke Babatunde Elegbede	Flag Officer Commanding, Sea Training Command
21	Air Vice Marshal M Yahaya	Air officer Commanding - Air Training Command
22	Air Commodore Bayo Lawal	Air Officer Commanding, Tactical Air Command
23	Air Commodore Nura Imam	Air Officer Commanding, Logistics Command
24	Air Commodore Larry Koinyan	Air Force
25	Lt-Col John Shagaya	Commander, 9 Mechanised Brigade
26	Lt-Col Halilu Akilu	Director-General, Directorate of Military Intelligence
27	Lt-Col Raji Alagbe Rasaki	Commander, Army Headquarters Garrison and Signal Group
28	Lt-Col Tanko Ayuba	Commander - Corps of Signals

Of the original 28 members who constituted the AFRC when Babangida first came to power in 1985, only 5 were still in place when he stepped down 8 years later in 1993 (Abacha, Dogonyaro, Aikhomu, Nyako and Elegbede). Elegbede was later murdered after being shot to death by gunmen on June 19, 1994 along the Gbagada/Owonshoki expressway in Lagos.

The Military Governors were as follows:

MILITARY GOVERNORS - SEPTEMBER 1985

STATE	MILITARY GOVERNOR
Anambra	Group Captain Samson Omeruah
Bauchi	Lt-Col Chris Garuba
Bendel	Lt-Col John Mark Inienger
Benue	Group Captain Jonah David Jang
Borno	Major Abdulmumuni Aminu
Cross River	Navy Captain Ekpo Archibong
Gongola	Lt-Col Yohanna Madaki
Imo	Navy Captain Allison Madueke
Kaduna	Major Abubakar Umar
Kano	Lt-Col A.M. Daku
Kwara	Wing Commander M.N. Umaru
Lagos	Group Captain Gbolahan Mudashiru
Niger	Lt-Col David Mark*
Ogun	Lt-Col Oladayo Popoola
Ondo	Navy Commander Mike Akhigbe
Oyo	Lt-Col Adetunji Idowu Olurin
Plateau	Lt-Col Chris Alli
Rivers	Police Commissioner Fidelis Oyakhilome
Sokoto	Col G. Mohammed

*Currently the Senate President

Babangida recognised the importance of timing and his assent was hailed by the media and public. Professor Omo Omoruyi claimed that Babangida came to office unprepared and with no political programme. Nothing could be further from the truth. Babangida is the only Nigerian military leader that actively sought political power prior to coming to office, prepared for it and waited patiently for it to come his way. He was probably the most prepared military ruler in Nigeria’s history. Babangida subsequently revealed the extent of preparation that preceded his ascent to power:

“At the risk of being called immodest, if there is any military government that prepared itself before it went in, it’s our government. We knew what we wanted. We knew what areas to address, especially the economy. We read the barometer of the society and we knew what the people wanted.”[1]

What he lacked in formal higher education, he made up for with his skill at human relationships, and native cunning. He had been building a political empire for years inside the barracks. Babangida created an army in his own image with both his own personal charm and with spontaneous acts of kindness to colleagues and subordinates. He is known to have an exceptional memory for names and faces and is able to recollect the first names of colleagues, subordinates, journalists, opponents and even their family members. He was genuinely kind and an excellent conversationalist who wore an ever present smile in private, official and social gatherings with both military and political colleagues. He had a marketing team, an image, and most importantly he had enforcers in all branches of the army.

“WHEN YOU STAGE A COUP, YOU HAVE TO TELL PEOPLE WHAT THEY WANT TO HEAR, SO YOU CAN GET ACCEPTED.”

Nigerian military regimes usually derive public acceptance and popularity by discrediting their predecessors, and by making grandiose promises of popular policy changes. Babangida understood these rules of the game. He explained that “When you stage a coup, you have to tell people what they want to hear, so you can get accepted.” His first political acts were aimed at gaining public acceptance and presenting himself as a smiling gap toothed General and benevolent dictator. He released politicians and journalists detained by Buhari’s regime and repealed Decree 4: the Public Officers (Protection Against False Accusation) Decree which made it a criminal offence to publish any article that brought the government or any public official into disrepute. Journalists Tunde Thompson and Nduka Irabor of the Guardian Newspapers were unfortunate enough to fall foul of Decree 4 and were imprisoned by the Buhari regime. Babangida released both Thompson and Irabor. Irabor would later become the press officer to Babangida’s deputy and in June 1993 would stain his name forever by allowing it to be associated with the gravest electoral event in Nigeria’s history when he circulated a statement annulling the results of the June 1993 presidential election. Babangida also suspended the execution of drug dealers.

Tunde Idiagbon:

CHARM - THE IBB MAGIC

Babangida’s superior charm made him appear more personable to senior and mid-level officers than the disciplinarian Buhari. Babangida was therefore able to gain broad support for his new regime. He neutralised potential critics by reaching out to renowned figures outside the military and convincing them to join the government. This gave him a first tier of military support, and a second tier of civilian support consisting of respected public figures who by their support of Babangida’s regime, tainted any possible future criticism of him. He gave his regime intellectual legitimacy by appointing technocrats such as Professor Wole Soyinka (chairman of the Federal Road Safety Corps), the respected World Bank economist Kalu Idika Kalu (Minister of Finance), esteemed professor of virology Professor Tam David-West (Petroleum Resources), Professor Olikoye Ransome-Kuti (Minister of Health) and Professor Bolaji Akinyemi (Minister of External Affairs). He set 1990 as the date for the return of civilian democratic rule, inaugurated a Political Bureau and encouraged public debate on a future democratic model for Nigeria. These measures made him immensely popular during his early days and he was hailed as a liberal and enlightened military ruler with a genuine concern for human rights and with an intricate reform agenda. His appointment of Commodore Ebitu Ukiwe as his deputy was hailed as evidence of his foresight and attempt to rehabilitee Igbos back into the military hierarchy. On assumption of the post, Ukiwe’s title was changed from “Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters” to “Chief of General Staff”.

In portraying himself as a listening President that valued public opinion, he also threw the nation’s economic policy into public debate. He invited public debate on how to deal with over $20 of billion foreign debt that Nigeria had accrued, and whether to seek additional loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Public opinion opposed further IMF loans so Babangida suspended negotiations with the IMF and rejected its loan, in a move that proved popular with the macho patriotism of the public. However the ever shrewd Babangida and his Finance Minister Kalu Idika Kalu imposed a set of economic reforms called the “Structural Adjustment Programme”, that were even more punishing than what the IMF demanded. These included doubling the price of petrol, tripling the price of diesel petrol, salary cuts, and massively devaluing the Naira. These moves triggered off a cycle of rapid inflation that severely battered the middle and lower income classes.

THE WHEELS COME OFF

Babangida started well and with good intentions, bust lost his way after realising how easily the public could be manipulated in a developing country. In the midst of the backslapping for Babangida, no one noticed that he retained the most detested Decree of all from the Buhari era: the dreaded Decree 2 of 1984 - the State security (Detention of Persons) Decree. This Decree permitted the Federal Military Government to detain any person considered by the Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters to be a security threat, for up to three months without charge or trial. Civil liberties organisations breathed a sigh of relief when Babangida took over, expecting Babangida to repeal Decree 2. Babangida not only retained it, but extended the detention period under Decree 2 to six months and later used it to detain those civil liberties and pro-democracy movements that had welcomed his assent to power. In the flurry of activity no one noticed that the “War Against Indiscipline” anti-corruption drive launched by the Buhari regime was also terminated. Time Magazine quoted a British source who claimed that “Babangida will always fall short on ruthless measures against corruption because nearly everyone involved in the government is corrupt.” Additionally no one questioned why he was releasing corrupt public officials that had been jailed on charges of massive looting of state treasuries. The Buhari regime created military tribunals to try public officers from the Shagari era that were accused of embezzling public funds. These tribunals were extremely controversial. They were chaired by military officers and had the power to impose massive prison sentences. The tribunals were composed as follows:

Lagos Zone:Brigadier Paul Omu (Chairman) Brigadier Malami Nassarawa Navy Captain Godwin Ndubuisi Kanu Lt-Colonel Adeyinka Martins Mr Justice Timothy Oyeyipo	Kaduna Zone (Kaduna, Kano and Sokoto States, and the Federal Capital Territory)Navy Captain M.A.B Elegbede (Chairman) Lt-Colonel Ibrahim Gumel Lt-Colonel Mohammed Maina Wing Commander John Abakpolor Mr Justice Paul Nwokedi
Ibadan Zone (Bendel, Kwara, Oyo, Ogun, and Ondo States)Brigadier Charles Ndiomu (Chairman) Commander Ibrahim Ogohi Lt-Colonel Yohanna Madaki Wing Commander Camica Ohadumere Mr Justice Saleh Minjibir	Jos Zone (Bauchi, Benue, Borno, Gongola and Plateau States)Brigadier Peter Adomokhai (Chairman) Navy Captain Jubril Ayinla Lt-Colonel Isaac Adebunmu Wing Commander Sunday Cole Mr Justice Joseph Ogundera
Enugu Zone (Anambra, Cross River, Imo and Rivers States)Air Commodore Muktar Mohammed (Chairman) Lt-Colonel Samuel Victor Leo Malu Wing Commander S.B. Suare Navy Captain Thompson Odibo Mr Justice Alhassa Idoko

The only right of appeal from the tribunals was to the SMC which was also exclusively comprised of military officers (and the Inspector-General of police). The military were effectively acting as prosecutor, judge and jury. Unsurprisingly the Nigerian Bar Association barred its member lawyers from participating in the tribunals. Nonetheless the trials went ahead and convicted and jailed several prominent politicians and officials including:

• Former Rivers State Governor Melford Okilo was jailed for 21 years for illegally holding bank accounts abroad, contrary to laws applying to Nigerian public officers.
• Finance Minister Victor Masi was convicted of corruptly receiving nearly $5.45 million from a construction company.
• For Kano State Governor Abubakar Rimi and his successor, Sabo Bakin Zuwo were jailed for 21 years for illegally accepting bribes to facilitate a property deal. Boxes full of cash were found in Zuwo’s home after a raid.
• Among other prominent politicians convicted by the tribunals were Anthony Enahoro, Jim Nwobodo, Ambrose Alli, Adamu Atta, Aper Aku, and Awwal Ibrahim.

Given that most of the convicted were already over fifty years old, they were likely to die in prison if they served the rest of their sentences. The tribunals effectively put Nigeria’s political elite in jail. However the controversy surrounding the tribunals’ composition created enough justification for Babangida to release the jailed politicians without the public asking whether irrespective of the nature of the tribunals, the defendants were actually guilty of the offences they were convicted of.

THE “CAUCUS”

The new regime included several trusted and loyal officers who served under Babangida during his days as commander of the armoured corps. He also did not make the same mistake as Buhari by failing to reward the officers who were instrumental in getting him to power. The two senior officers that were the public face of the coup (Maj-Gen Abacha and Brigadier Dogonyaro) were appointed Chief of Army Staff and GOC of the 3^rd armoured division respectively. He also included relatively junior officers from the coup in the AFRC (Lt-Cols Shagaya, Halilu Akilu, Tanko Ayuba and Raji Rasaki). Other Lt-Cols that were instrumental to the coup were also awarded by being appointed Military Governors (Lt-Cols John Mark Inienger, Yohanna Madaki, David Mark, Sambo Dasuki, and Majors Abubakar Umar and Abdulmumuni Aminu) or being appointed to the Federal Executive Council (Brigadier Jerry Useni and Lt-Cols Ahmed Abdullahi and Anthony Ukpo). He could not have got to power without these men and they remained his support base and the spine of his regime. This inner caucus was reinforced by Babangida’s colleagues and old school mates from Bida whom he planted around him in the concentric circle immediately adjacent to the coup caucus. The Bida alumni included Maj-Gens Mamman Vatsa and Gado Nasko - both of whom were in the Federal Executive Council. Only those who risked their lives for him and who were trusted were allowed within his corridors of power.

Babangida’s constant gap toothed smile and genuine bonhomie was a welcome departure from the stern glacial countenance of Buhari and Idiagbon. His charm was also enough to disarm the most cynical sceptic. However when it came to security and his personal survival, Babangida’s “Mr Nice Guy” image had its limits. Babangida was security conscious to the point of paranoia. His paranoia stemmed from his experience as an expert coup plotter over three decades. He later revealed in an interview with Tell Magazine that he had been involved in every successful coup in Nigeria’s history - making him the Nigerian army’s most prolific coup plotter. He was well aware that others in the army were willing to take him on:

“When I became the President, there were about 23 of us who were the coup plotters at that time and immediately that coup was successful, I sat the 23 of us together and said: congratulations, we made it but remember one thing, just like we took up guns and toppled a government we also have to watch because somebody would one day want to topple us and this is because I understood the nature of the Nigerian person.”

FRIENDS FALL OUT

It did not take long for Babangida’s prediction to materialise. Babangida’s rise to power was followed the customary purge of personnel whose loyalty could not be guaranteed. However, Babangida had not purged thoroughly enough. In early December 1985, rumours of a coup plot began circulating in military and political circles. With the government making no announcement on the allegations, several names were mentioned as alleged instigators of a coup. The rumours swept around the barracks too and the name of Mamman Vatsa (Minister of the Federal Capital Territory) crept up. The rumours got to Vatsa’s orderly who did not know how to approach his boss about such a sensitive issue. The orderly therefore disclosed the rumours to Vatsa’s wife, who in turn urged her husband to talk the issue out with Babangida.

Babangida and Vatsa had been friends since boyhood and were old classmates in school, having attended the Bida Middle School together. They were also course mates from their cadet days having enlisted in the Nigerian Military Training College on the same day, commissioned into the army on the same day and holding equal rank and seniority to each other. In the company of two of their mutual friends (one of whom was Gado Nasko), Vatsa met with Babangida and asked him how he could suspect his own friend of coup plotting. According to Babangida Vatsa asked him “You heard I was planning a coup and couldn’t even ask me. What kind of friend are you?” Babangida replied “I didn’t believe it or are you planning a coup?” Vatsa replied in the negative.

The coup rumours were so wild that even Nasko’s name was being peddled as a suspect by rumour mongers. Babangida refused to believe Nasko was involved and said “I don’t like to hear this nonsense.” The matter was forgotten until the ultra security conscious Babangida became convinced that there was a genuine coup plot. At this stage, Vatsa was likely to escape with his life since Babangida was unsure of his guilt. However, Vatsa made a crucial mistake. According to Babangida:

“While the investigations were going on, the investigators said they wanted to take him into Intercell (Interrogation Centre), but I insisted that Vatsa should not be treated like others, not while I was the head of government. First he was (and still is) my friend, secondly, he is a General. I told them the best I could allow him was for him to be restricted to his house….then there was an attempt to escape through the hole of an air conditioner and that’s where we had to concede to put him in the cell.”[2]

ANOTHER COUP PLOT

On December 20, 1985 the government formally acknowledged the issue when Maj-Gen Domkat Bali (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Defence Secretary) announced that “officers from all the services were recruiting followers and concluding plans for the overthrow of the government.” Bali claimed the plotters planned to overthrow the government because:

• They opposed the retention of some public officers from the former regime.
• The new regime was too concerned with human rights.
• The drafting of middle grade officers to public office.
• The government’s rejection of a loan from the International Monetary Fund.

Analysed objectively, the reasons stated by Bali for the coup seem amateurish but were not disbelieved or critically appraised by a gullible public that was still intoxicated on Babangida’s charm. If these were the real reasons, the plotters would have had immense difficulty in convincing the public and their armed forces colleagues that these were sufficient justifications for a violent coup. A more plausible synopsis is that the coup was the culmination of the power struggle between the pro-Buhari and pro-Babangida factions in the army. The plotters belonged to the former faction and might have advocated a return to the disciplinarian ethos of the Buhari regime. This gave the government latitude to embellish the coup’s rationale in Bali’s statement. However Bali did not name the perpetrators. This led to a further round of rumours and gossip about the potential suspects. Babangida later jocularly suggested that the only officer not to be linked with the coup was Babangida himself.

THE SUSPECTS

On December 27, 1985 (exactly one week after Bali’s announcement) the Information Minister Lt-Col Anthony Ukpo named the coup suspects:

Maj-Gen Mamman Vatsa

Brigadier Malami Nassarawa

Group Captain Ita David Ikpeme

Group Captain Salaudeen Latinwo

Lt-Col Musa Bitiyong

Lt-Col Moses Effiong

Lt-Col Michael Iyorshe

Lt-Col Emmanuel Obeya

Lt-Col Christian Oche

Major Daniel Bamidele

Major D. Edwin-West

Wing Commander Ben Ekele

Wing Commander Adamu Sakaba

Squadron Leader Martin Luther

INVESTIGATIONS

Ikpeme and Latinwo were former Military Governors. Ikpeme formerly governed Ondo state, and Latinwo formerly governed Kwara state. Ikpeme and Latinwo were subsequently released after interrogation and were and not tried. Nassarawa was the commandant of the army’s infantry school in Jaji, and one of the surviving northern officers that staged a mutiny in July 1966. Additionally it was the first time that air force and navy officers were accused of coup plotting. A Special Investigation Panel headed by Sani Sami was tasked with investigating the coup. The panel also included police officer Alhaji Gambo Jimeta, Group Captain Anthony Ikhazobor and the panel secretary was Lt-Col Ajibola Kunle Togun. As a result of these investigations over 100 other officers were arrested and interrogated. Eventually in addition to the 14 officers above, Lt.-Col J.O Onyeke, Captain G.I L Sese, and Lt K.G. Dakpa were also implicated and included in the list of officers to be tried by a Special Military Tribunal. Solidarity rallies were held in support of Babangida. These solidarity rallies would become a common feature of the military regime that succeeded him.

Next Part: The Vatsa Affair: “From detention the prolific writer Vatsa wrote a detention diary every day to chronicle his ordeal. When he didn’t have paper he wrote on toilet rolls and handkerchiefs which were smuggled out. Investigators searched Vatsa’s house thoroughly, going through his massive library and opening up his books. They were excited by the presence of two locked safes in Vatsa’s house”

maxsiollun@yahoo.com

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[1] Karl Maier - Midnight in Nigeria.

[2] This Day, Agust 19, 2006.

Interview with Lamidi Adedibu

With Lamidi Adedibu passing away this week, a lot of column inches have been occupied discussing him.  Rather than add to the column inches, I thought site visitors might be interested to see this television interview with him.  Enjoy.

WHAT IF ABIOLA HAD BECOME PRESIDENT?

As the 15^th anniversary of the annulment of the June 12, 1993 election approaches, I ask a question that Nigerians rarely ask, and will never know the answer to.

The facts of the annulment are well known. After the painstaking eight year conduct of a “transition programme” to return Nigeria to civilian democratic rule after 9 years of military rule, the then military government led by General Ibrahim Babangida voided the results of the June 12, 1993 election that was supposed to herald the return of democracy. That act added the word “annulment” to the standard Nigerian vocabulary. Although the full election results were never disclosed, everyone knows that Moshood Abiola won. However, given his antecedents, background and temperament, would Abiola have been a beneficial President for Nigeria?

The story of Abiola’s life is a classic rags to riches story that could be a Hollywood film. He was born into poverty in a large family. His birth came after a series of failed pregnancies, still born children and infant deaths in his family. He eventually attended the famous Baptist Boys High School in his home town of Abeokuta, in Ogun State. Former President Olusegun Obasanjo is another alumnus of that school. Afterward he studied accountancy at the University of Glasgow in Scotland. He then worked with the multi-national pharmaceutical company Pfizer. However Abiola made his name and riches when he joined the telecommunications company International Telegraph and Telephone (ITT). Abiola eventually became the chairman of ITT and via series of cordial relations with key army officers, Abiola amassed so much wealth, influence and fame that he once boasted of being the richest African on Earth.

Two of Abiola’s closest military friends were then Minister of Communications Brigadier Murtala Muhammed and Lt-Col Ibrahim Babangida. Abiola met Babangida in 1974 when Abiola was selling radio systems to the military. Babangida was sent to evaluate the quality of devices being sold by Abiola. According to Babangida “From that time the relationship developed and he was always around”. Abiola also met Brigadier Muhammed after bravely confronting Muhammed over a series of debts owed to Abiola’s company by Muhammed’s Communications Ministry. The normally fearsome and ruthless Muhammed was impressed by Abiola’s courage and the two struck up a friendship. With Babangida and Muhammed eventually becoming Heads of State, Abiola exploited his relationship with them to secure extensive patronage via contracts with the government and became spectacularly rich in the process. His business empire grew massively as did his bank account balance, number of wives, concubines and children.

With his perpetual wealth ensured, Abiola turned to politics and joined the ruling party, the National Party of Nigeria (NPN). The NPN had an elaborate zoning system for the distribution of government portfolios - including the presidency. Since the presidency had been zoned to President Shagari (from the north), Abiola assumed that when President Shagari’s term of office expired, the NPN would zone the presidency to the south, and he would be allowed to run for President. He was wrong. His presidential ambition was rebuffed by the powerful Minister of Transport Umaru Dikko who told him that “the presidency is not for sale to the highest bidder”. Abiola “retired” from politics soon after - totally exasperated with the NPN. He would have his revenge. President Shagari reported that several frustrated politicians engaged in what he termed “coup baiting” against his government. Abiola had a massive publishing empire was used to launch frequent vitriolic attacks on President Shagari’s government with the intention of discrediting it sufficiently to psychologically prepare the public for its replacement by a military regime. In his memoirs (”Beckoned to Serve”), President Shagari later obliquely referred to the financing and support given to military conspirators by an unnamed “well known business tycoon”. Although he declined to name this tycoon, contextually it was an obvious reference to Abiola. Babangida went further in unequivocally confirming Abiola’s role in financing a coup plot against Shagari and using his influence to destabilise Shagari’s government. He later revealed that Abiola:

“was also very good in trying to mould the thinking of the media. We relied on him a lot for that. So there was both the media support and the financial support.” (Karl Maier - Midnight in Nigeria)

President Shagari was overthrown in a military coup on December 31, 1983 and replaced by a military government in which Abiola’s friend Babangida was Chief of Army Staff (number 3 in the regime). Less than two years later Abiola was at it again and financed another military coup which eventually led to his friend Babangida becoming Head of State. Abiola’s wife Simbiat was opposed to his involvement in politics. However after she died in 1992 Abiola returned to politics and ran for President in an election stage managed by his bosom friend Babangida. As a southern Muslim (the religion of the north) and who was a close friend of the Head of State, an Abiola presidency seemed a virtual certainty. As results began trickling in, it became obvious that Abiola was headed for a landslide victory. He even defeated his opponent Bashir Tofa in Tofa’s home state of Kano. For the first time Nigerians voted across ethnic and religious lines as Christians voted for a Muslim, and northerners voted for a southerner. However something went very wrong. On June 23, 1993 the election was annulled and Abiola was denied the presidency. Five years later Abiola was dead, having been incarcerated for treason for declaring himself the rightful president.

So what would have happened had the election not been annulled and had Abiola ruled? A powerful hard line faction in the military bitterly opposed his candidacy. Babangida later said that had Abiola become President, he would have been overthrown in a violent military coup within six months. The then Director-General of military intelligence Brigadier Halilu Akilu was quoted as saying that “Abiola will be President over my dead body”. Other officers in the regime such as General Sani Abacha and Brigadier David Mark (current Senate President) promised to overthrow or even kill Abiola if he became President. With such opposition to him in the army, an Abiola presidency would almost certainly have led to new round of bloody coups and counter-coups that would have given the military a pretext to retain power. Nigeria might even have still been under military rule today.

But what if the military had supported Abiola? Would an Abiola presidency have been good for Nigeria? Abiola did not win the June 12, 1993 election because he was a massively popular candidate. He won and was adopted as an unlikely symbol of democracy by a public that was desperate to rid Nigeria of increasingly corrupt and authoritarian military rule. To the public, any candidate was better than the military. Olusegun Obasanjo warned that “Abiola is “not the Messiah that Nigerians are looking for”. How (in)accurate was Obasanjo’s assessment of Abiola?

Having come from a poor background Abiola was extremely generous to the poor and made grandiose charitable donations. These took the form of bulk buys of rice and tinned milk, to constructing new wings in new universities. He also awarded several hundred scholarships from his own personal fortune. Abiola made such gestures country-wide and did not limit them to his own ethnic or geographic group. He had contacts and friends across all ethnicities and regions of the country. It was also hoped that Abiola’s stupendous wealth meant that he was rich enough not to be tempted to loot the state treasury. A rich multi-billionaire southern businessman from the south, who adopted the religion of the north and had extensive local and international contacts, the perception was that if Abiola could not govern, no one could.

However Abiola had many weaknesses which might have proved his undoing had he become President. His first and foremost weakness was for female flesh. His appetite for women was such that a decade after his death, not even his own family is aware of how many wives and children he had. Educated estimates put the number of his wives somewhere between 25 and 40, and children anywhere between 85 and 120. He also had a number of concubines. Such a complicated personal life could have proved embarrassing and destabilising for a President in the public eye and would probably have occupied several column inches for gleeful tabloids.

Although from humble origins, in adulthood Abiola was no firebrand political reformer and he was unlikely to rock the boat or risk physical challenge. In many ways he was part of Nigeria’s corrupt elite and a government led by him would have continued with business and corrupt dealings as usual. His emergence as a presidential candidate was predicated on his membership of that corrupt elite. In the end the same military Leviathan which Abiola sponsored and supported ended up devouring him.

The Danjuma Interview

There have been a lot of requests for me to post the full text of Lt-General T.Y. Danjuma’s interview with the Nigerian Guardian regarding his role in the July 1966 coup and the arrest/death of the then Head of State Maj-Gen Aguiyi-Ironsi. Here is the interview….

SUNDAY GUARDIAN-17th february,2008

You were quoted as saying that your memoirs would be one grenade of a book, why?

You know; there are so many versions of some the critical events that took place over the years in which I was involved. Some of the versions are sanitized; some of them are slightly inaccurate, which I will endeavour to correct. And in correcting them, there will be a few explosions. You know what a grenade is- it explodes.
Unfortunately, for me, each time I pick up my notes and try to write, I have to relive some of those very tense periods and I am so worked up. So, what I have decided to do is oral history- tell the story to a writer who’ll record, transcribe and so on and the book will bear his name and mine.
Will you, in the book correct, for example, the many stories around the coup in Ibadan in 1966 and your alleged role in the killing of Aguiyi-Ironsi and Adekunle Fajuyi?

The interesting thing about the Ibadan coup where Ironsi was arrested is that the full story is already in print. If you take the book written on me by Lindsay Barrett, the account given there with General ( Yakubu ) Gowon’s biography written by Professor Isawa Eliaugu – if you read that part of the book, the account there of what happened – if you put them together, a lot of the grey areas will be clear.
Well, you still have to clear some speculations here concerning your role. It is said that you broke Ironsi’s famous swagger stick, which was thought to be his magic wand. Did you? Did your people drag Ironsi on the road? Did you take him to Iwo road and shoot him?
No, it is not true. What happened was that after we arrested him, I lost control. Remember that I was a complete stranger. I came from Lagos with Ironsi as a staff in the Army Headquarters attached to him. I stayed in the barracks with the Adjutant ( the Chief of Staff of the Commanding Officer ). I stayed with him in his single officer quarters. And it was there, that at one or two o’clock in the morning – I was in bed – when he came and knocked at my door. He said, “sir, do you know what has happened.” I said, “no”. he said there was some trouble in Abeokuta, who was an Igbo officer holding secret meeting with all the Igbo officers in the officers’ mess and our boys went and shot all of them.

Who are the “our boys?”

Northern soldiers. Remember, Igbos did the killings that took place in January (1966 ).
They killed non-Igbo senior Army officers. Only one Igbo officer the killed but Igbo wiped out almost all the senior non –Igbo officers. We rounded up all the people, who did the killings, because we all help Ironsi to abort the January coup. They were rounded up and put in jail, where they were being paid their full salary.

They had television, they had everything there despite being detained and nobody was talking about court marshalling them. Instead, the newspapers including the Daily Times, in fact Peter Enahoro, who was named Peter Pan; in his Sunday newspaper(wrote a column) to the effect that The boys being detained were national heroes. National heroes because they killed corrupt politicians! He didn’t say anything about Army officers…
they killed corrupt politicians and replaced them with lronsi whom we would call Iron-side Very insulting and in my own opinion, very provocative article! He was saying that those boys should be freed. Tension started building. Riots broke out in the North and it was because of the riots that broke out in the North that Ironsi started going round to talk to traditional rulers and the Army leaders. I was in his convoy.

We got to Ibadan. We had a meeting with traditional rulers and leaders of thought at the end of which everybody was asked to sing the National Anthem. We all sang the National Anthem. In the night, we had dinner and we came back. We dropped him (Ironsi) at Government House, and then went to the barracks to stay with the AdjutantThen, at one o’clock in the night (there was) gbam, gbam, gbam on my door. I said what happened. He (Adjutant) said there was some trouble in Abeokuta. I said what was it? He said the man on duty - duty officer - saw the Commanding Officer holding meetings in the officers’ mess … all the officer that attended that meeting were Igbos. They left out non-Igbo officers. The duty officer called one or two soldiers; they cocked their guns, went there and rounded up every body. They thought it was a joke. One of them had his staff machine gun by his side and he bent down and attempted to pick it up; they opened up on him and shot him down.

They sprayed everybody, killed everybody there and started tele phoning.
They rang Ibadan. It was then that this boy woke me up. This was what happened. The press had been calling for the release of the January coup plotters. Now, our boys had created an excuse for the release. After killing these people, it is a draw – they killed Army officers in Lagos and all overNigeria. Igbos did it. Now,Igbos had been killed in Abeokuta; that’d be the end of it. I said no. I asked the Adjutant, who was in a position to know, if the Supreme Commander - at that time lronsi was known as Supreme Commander - had been told? He said, no; he didn’ think so. I said okay; he
should get me some soldiers. He brought soldiers. I didn’t come to lbadan with combat dress. I had to borrow the combat dress of an officer about my size. It was an American combat dress. This officer had just come back from the US. You know, when you travel with the Head of state you have to dress decently, wear service dress and so on. So, I borrowed fatigue, wore it. In fact, I wore it over my pyjamas and left with the Adjutant. I said, “take me to Government House”. We got there. We asked soldiers who
were on duty to ground arms. They all grounded their arms. I told the Adjutant what to do. Soldiers grounded their arms; we disarmed them and armed the soldiers that we brought.

Meanwhile, the anti-tank gun (lronsi convoy) was there, the commander was there. The commander was from the garrison in Ibadan. We knew him; we told him. He said we should use the gun to blow down the building. I said no,There’s no need; the Head of State was there; we had to arrest him. We were there and waited. Any time anybody came out from the building, we arrested him. They removed their shoes and we asked them to sit down.

Why were you doing this?

We didn’t want any violence. we wanted to arrest him ( Ironsi ) alive and go and lock him up.we wanted to interrogate him, to find out the role he played in the coup ( January 1966 ); his stories didn’t add up about how he escaped from flagstaff House where he was staying at No.1,Glover (Ikoyi), and ended up in Ikeja.How it came about Njoku,who was supposed to have handed over the command of the largest garrison in lagos, which was then the Ikeja Garison, did not handover.Njoku was still in commandand he (Ironsi) went to join him. We were going to interrogate him about all those, or at least, that was what I thought we were
going to do.

So, every I told the soldiers to do or not to do,they obeyed until eventually, first, (Adekunle)Fajuyi (Millitary Governor of Western Region) came out of the building after he Waited… every time they sent somebody out of the building, nobody went back. So, Fajuyi Came down. As he came down the steps, I saluted-him-and said; “sir, you are under arrest; hands up’ He looked at me and called me, “Danjuma?” I said, “Sir, you are under arrest.”
He raised his hands, and came down. He said, “What do you want?” I said,
“we want to arrest you and we want to arrest the Head of State.”

He said,”and you are going out with him?” I said, “yes .. .”
And you were supposed to be on the Supreme Commander’s
entourage?

I was;I was there. I went to Ibadan with him. What do you mean by,”supposed to?”

Because you were now arresting…

Yes, I was arresting. He (Fajuyi) pleaded with me not to go up with armed men;that he was going to go up and call him (Ironsi) provided I guaranteed his safety. I gave him my guarantee: I said, “I guarantee your safety.”
He went there, and didn’t come down. So, I decided to climb up. As I climbed up the steps, armed soldiers followed me. I had a grenade in my hand. I didn’t have any arm. As I came, lronsi was sitted; Fajuyi was by his side.
I said, “Sir, you are under arrest.” And I gave him the order to stand up.
Reluctantly, Ironsi stood up. He used to carry a staff crocodile. He had it in his hand. They both came down. Fajuyi was still asking me about guaranteeing safety. I guaranteed his safety absolutely. So, we came out of the building down toward the car.

One of the soldiers said we shouldn’t allow him to carry his crocodile, that there’s juju. I said no; there’s nothing in it. He said he’d disappear if we allowed him to carry it. He started to stop and I told him to shut up. That was the time I lost control. The soldier batoned me and pushed me aside and took charge. To my greatest surprise, the Adjutant, who was, you know, these were his troops - I was a stranger,
they were obeying me because everything I did they liked; they liked what I was doing, but the moment I told them not to do some thing they didn’t like, they rejected - I expected the Adjutant, who was there, to intervene. He probably incited them. He said,”Yes, the soldier is right. This thing here (Ironsi’s crocodile) is his Zasa; it’s juju that will make him disappear.”
So, they took the thing from him, pushed me aside and bundled him and Fajuyi in a vehicle and drove away. It was six O’clock in the morning.
The front of the Government House was littered with people without shoes; people who had come to get ready to go. They asked every one of them to sit on the floor and they removed their shoes. They all sat, including the then Head of Service (Chief P Odumosu). I came down. They (soldiers) drove away.
There was nobody to tell these people to go; so they all sat there. It was I who said, what’re you people still doing here. Quietly, they realized they were free to go. They (soldiers) had driven away Fajuyi and Ironsi.

What of you?

I had to hitch a ride to go to the barracks. They left; there was no vehicle even for me to leave that place; they Just drove away, taking them away.So, I had to make my way back to the barracks. If you read Gowon’s book, it’s there. They named names , of the people who actually took Ironsi away.

Now, there are a lot of lies. I read some very funny lies told by Ironsi’s ADC whose life I saved. He was an Igbo officer from Abakaliki area, tall, a good-looking chap. After the war he came back, I saw him, we shook hands and I gave him some money.
I read his account. You know we captured a lot of literature in Enugu. The Igbos named his account, including what happened in Ibadan, and what happened in the North - as pogrom. I read all the accounts there. It was there that I saw the evidence given by this man in order to … he must have felt guilty, when his boss was arrested and taken away and he went away and he went home empty-handed, without anything even though he was his ADC and nothing happened to him. He had to tell a lie to justify how he came out with his limbs intact. He gave a long story of how he escaped, what happened and so on.

That man told a lot of the lies that gained currency. Ironsi had two ADCs. One of them was Col. Sani Bello and the other was this man. I prevailed on the soldiers not to do anything to anybody. We arranged even for him to escape, and go away. He went home and started telling lies. He told a lot of lies, which I read in the account he gave in Biafra. We had an inquiry. People came to give account and so on and so forth. Unfortunately, I didn’t keep it, but I remember that the stories that gained currency were from that man.

The Adjutant created the problem?.

He didn’t create the prob1em. The Igbos who killed our senior officers all over the place created the problem; they created the problem. They sowed the wind and reaped the problem; it wasn’t him (the Adjutant). They were reacting;they were avenging what happened in January. The July coup was a revenge coup.

What’s the name of the Adjutant?

Garba Paiko!
Was he a major?
Major! He was a Second Lieutenant.

You were his senior?

Oh yes! But when it comes to coup-making, there’s no rank. Coup is abandwagon of hierarchy. This was his unit. He knew the boys; I didn’t know them. But he knew me.He used me…

You’re lucky they didn’t mistake you for an Igbo.
Oh, easily! I was lighter in complexion than I am no. Many times, they took me for an Igbo.

So, he (Adjutant) didn’t create the problem?

I don’t think you people know what happened. What would you do when you went to bed and woke up and found that all the people from your area in the Army, innocent people were killed in their beds, some of them even with their wives - all done by Igbo officers? We bottled up this for six months from January to July. Then, the opportunity came for revenge.
In the Army, you are taught that when you are fired upon, you take cover and return fire. We didn’t return fire immedi¬ately. We gave Ironsi a chance to deal with the people who killed our seniors. He did not. Then foolish people like (Peter Pan) Enahoro were talking about national heroes ¬that people who did the killings were national heroes.
We couldn’t understand! If politicians were corrupt, why didn’t you confine yourself to killing politicians? If it was necessary that the Army should take over, why was it that this same Army should eliminate the cream of that Army and leave us With absolutely useless people, like Ironsi who was a desk-clerk Head of State? We couldn’t understand it. But we bottled this up till July and when the opportunity came, we decided to revenge. This is what happened…

People blame you for what happened in Ibadan, but as it is, the Adjutant more or less, instigated the soldiers..
Yes, this is what I suspect. My suspicion is borne out by the fact that he did not do what I would do if I were in his position. He (Adjutant) approved of what the boys did.

ARE NIGERIANS BEING UNFAIR TO OBASANJO?

What a difference a few years make. A decade ago, General Olusegun Obasanjo was hailed as a respected international elder statesman with goodwill at home and abroad. His return to politics has utterly tarnished his reputation and Nigerian newspapers are flooded with daily vitriolic attacks on his leadership, personality and private life. It seems that becoming President for a second time destroyed his legacy. What went wrong?

It seems that Nigerian leadership is a poisoned chalice. Each Nigerian leader is always welcomed with tremendous goodwill, but is usually savagely attacked and their legacy denigrated after leaving office. Prime Minister Balewa is not remembered as Nigeria’s humble golden voiced first independence leader. He is the forgotten Prime Minister that presided over a corrupt regime that was violently overthrown by the army. Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi’s role as the greatest African soldier of his generation is rarely mentioned. He is simply the forgotten leader who could not do anything right. General Gowon is not the magnanimous leader who led the country through its worst crisis and kept the country together after a brutal civil war. He is just another corrupt military dictator who stayed too long. Even the once reverred General Murtala Muhammed is now criticised for desroting civil service morale with his purges, and is often recalled as a “war criminal”. General Obasanjo’s role as the first Nigerian leader to voluntarily leave office is no longer remembered. President Shagari is remembered as a lame duck President that presided over a chaotic administration and who let his Transport Minister loot the treasury. Major-General Buhari is not a principled leader who tried to fight corruption and introduce sanity and discipline into public life. He is a heavy handed human rights abuser. General Babangida is the man who presided over the most painstakingly conducted presidential election in Nigeria’s history, then voided the results. Ernest Shonekan is a footnote. General Abacha was the man who took Nigeria to the depths of hell and ruined its international standing. The second coming of Obasanjo was not a welcome relief from decades of miliary misrule, but was the “worst” ruler in Nigeria’s history. How true? Has Nigeria ever had a good leader?

Have Nigerians been so brutalised by years of misrule that they reflexively criticise any leader? Nigerians are professional complainers when it comes to their leaders. Savage attacks on the country’s rulers in a national past-time. They have not been fair to Obasanjo in this regard. On both occasions that he has ruled Nigeria, Obasanjo has left the country in better shape than he found it. After he left office in 1979, each successive government after him was worse than the one preceding it. Then he bucked the trend when he returned to power in 1999. He inherited a broken, dispirited, bitter, bankrupt and ostracised country that was wrecked by years of misrule, military coups and looting.

Yet Obasanjo is blamed for problems he did not create and which he inherited. Little attention is paid to his accomplishments such as fighting corruption and at least elevating it to a national talking point. In the days of General Abacha, the General’s son was fond of using the Central Bank of Nigeria as a personal bank account and would withdraw raw cash from it. Before Obasanjo, no Nigerian public official had ever been prosecuted and convicted of corruption. Obasanjo’s drive against corruption claimed prominent scalps such as the Inspector-General of Police, and state governors. Such measures were unprecedented. His efforts to reduce corruption also led to Nigeria’s Paris Club debt being paid off, in the process making Nigeria the first African country to pay off its Paris Club debt. These debts it should be remembered, were incurred between 1980-1999 (the exact period of time between Obasanjo leaving office after his first stint as Head of State and returning to leadership nearly 20 years later).

Obasanjo also did something which no leader before him, military or civilian was courageous enough to do. He defanged the military, by retiring politicised officers and professional coup plotters who were responsible for the military coups that constantly stunted Nigerian democracy. Before leaving office and handing over to his successor President Yar’Adua, Obasanjo sarcastically noted the manner in which he is blamed for all of Nigeria’s problems, whether or not in fact he is responsible for them:

“Many of them blame Obasanjo, and like the man in the drama, even when his wife does not have a child, Obasanjo is to blame. And, if he wants only one child and his wife has multiple births, Obasanjo will be blamed. Those who blame someone else for their own inadequacies will want to substitute Obasanjo for Yar’Adua. But it doesn’t work because it’s only when you identify your own inadequacies and correct them that we would move forward.”

Site Updates: please note that the great speeches section has been updated with the speeches of (a) Gen Sani Abacha upon taking power in November 1993, and (b) Gen Abdulsalam Abubakar after the death of MKO Abiola in 1998

WHAT REALLY HAPPENED TO ABACHA AND ABIOLA?

How quickly we forget. Flashback 10 years. The political situation was as follows:

• Nigeria was being ruled by a ruthless and reclusive military dictator called General Sani Abacha
• General Olusegun Obasanjo and over 50 other army officers were in jail on trumped up charges of coup plotting.
• Nigeria had become a pariah nation after being expelled from the Commonwealth for executing Ken Saro-Wiwa and other activists who were campaigning for a fairer share of Nigerian oil revenues and against the environmental damage caused to their lands by the drilling and spills of big oil companies.
• Lt-General Oladipo Diya, Major-Generals Abdulkareem Adisa and Tajudeen Olanrewaju, and several other officers were on death row awaiting execution for their role in another coup plot.
• The winner of the acclaimed June 12 1993 election Chief MKO Abiola had been in jail for 4 years, kept incommunicado from the outside world.
• General Abacha was on the verge of transforming himself from a military ruler to civilian President having strong armed all the 5 political parties (”five fingers of the same leprous hand”) into adopting him as their presidential candidate.
• Genuine democracy seemed far, far away.

Plus a lot of the “pro democracy” activists shamelessly abandoned Abiola to join Abacha (Olu Onagoruwa, Baba Gana Kingibe). Even ministers in Abacha’s regime were not safe. The Guardian Newspapers (owned by Abacha’s minister Ibru) was proscribed by a newspaper proscription Decree and shut down after it criticised the government. It was the paper’s continual criticism of Abacha’s regime that led to the near fatal assassination attempt on Ibru.

The Abacha -v- Abiola power struggle was holding the entire country hostage. Abacha’s thirst for power and Abiola’s unrealised mandate. Even if Abacha is removed, what to do about Abiola who won a credible election? Then the following cataclysmic events happened in the space of 30 days:

On June 8 1998 Abacha dies of a heart attack and is hurriedly buried without an autopsy by the time the news filters through to most Nigerians. Nigerians publicly celebrate the death of a reviled leader with wild jubilation. General Abdulsalam Abubakar quickly replaces Abacha and announces that Abiola will be released but that he had to realise that his mandate had expired. A lot of chicanery was used to get Abiola to renounce but he refused. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan is sent to talk to him and explain that his “term of office” had expired since 5 years had passed since the June 12 1993 election. All to no avail. Exactly one month after the death of Abacha, Abiola suddenly dies of a heart attack on July 7 1998.

With Abacha, Abiola and the June 12 issue out of the way, General Abubakar announces a swift 10 month programme for a return to civilian democratic rule. Just 10 months after Nigeria seemed doomed to perpetual military rule under General Abacha, the military steps down and a new democratic government is elected under President Obasanjo. The speed with which Abacha’s infrastructure was dismantled just seemed too contrived. With Abacha alive and Abiola incarcerated, most people thought democracy was years away in Nigeria. Just 10 months after his death everything he did was undone: his killer squad was dismantled, coup convicts and pro democracy activists released, Nigeria back in the Commonwealth, democracy restored, and the army back in the barracks. Note that a lot of Abacha’s cronies survived in office and resurfaced in subsequent dispensations (Sarki Mukhtar - NSA, Jerry Gana etc).

Somehow exactly 30 days apart, both men die of heart attacks. Abacha is prevented from becoming a civilian ruler, from executing the condemned men like Diya, Adisa and Olanrewaju, and a recalcitrant Abiola (who refuses to renounce his mandate) also dies. Problem gone, debate over, fresh start. All rather convenient isn’t it?…. How easily we forget….

Another Excellent Series of Biafra Videos

This is another series of documentaries on Biafra. Produced by Nigeria’s own NTA, these videos feature interviews with the key players such as Gowon, Ojukwu, Maj-Gens Mohammed Shuwa, Adeyinka Adebayo and David Ejoor, plus civilian participants like Philip Asiodu and Ahmed Joda who were key players in the abortive negotiations prior to the war. Of great vintage is the footage of the Aburi debate in Ghana in 1967. Amazing footage of Ojukwu chatting with Gowon, Hassan Katsina, Commodore Joseph Wey and other members of the federal delegation to Aburi.

Part 1

http://youtube.com/watch?v=ii-8KYgcdj8

Part 2

http://youtube.com/watch?v=gPEM5nHbuGM&feature=related

Part 3

http://youtube.com/watch?v=uUefCmOj9Kc&feature=related

Part 4

http://youtube.com/watch?v=s1HJQNF8OJM&feature=related

Part 5

http://youtube.com/watch?v=3GjylQpZD5o&feature=related

Part 6

http://youtube.com/watch?v=RwiriHMbtnk&feature=related

Part 7

http://youtube.com/watch?v=j4QJeKSQhaw&feature=related

Part 8

http://youtube.com/watch?v=5R1GgXE0IHs

Part 9

http://youtube.com/watch?v=mq2BaRswfpg&feature=related

Part 10

http://youtube.com/watch?v=kZENtT0o1Ls&feature=related

Part 11

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NGWxFFqRJb4

Part 12:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DN8pVvqWFwg

Part 13

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OXJJoTz4XvQ

Part 14

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oJl-8N2nLWA

Part 15

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E-NbovwDvmk

Part 16

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CjLRC4dIPlM

Ken Saro-Wiwa, the Delta, Oil and Ogonis

These videos are condensed videos from an excellent 1995 Channel 4 documentary (called “Delta Force”) on the Ogoni oil crisis. It aired a few days after Saro-Wiwa was executed. These videos cover the conflict over oil and natural resources between big oil companies, the Ogonis and the then ruthless military government in Nigeria. The videos also feature footage from the Civil Disturbances Special Tribunal which sentenced Saro-Wiwa to death.

Part 1

http://uk.youtube.com/watch?v=YZhy_VaYisU

Part 2

http://uk.youtube.com/watch?v=nNaY4xBiQp8&feature=related

Interview with Major Nzeogwu

 

Another nugget from Nigerian history.  This is the text of Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu’s famous interview with Dennis Ejindu in May 1967.  This interview took place just before the start of the civil war.  It is probably the most detailed question and answer session with Major Nzeogwu.  Enjoy….

Ejindu: I am glad to meet you, Sir. How would you feel if you knew that you are being regarded as a hero?  

Nzeogwu: Very pleased naturally. But the truth is that I am not a hero. If there was any famous Major Nzeogwu, I have never heard of him.

Ejindu: It is rumoured that you have just finished writing a book, what is it like?

Nzeogwu: Good gracious! Ninety-nine per cent of all the stories you hear in this country are false. I have not written any book because there was nothing to write about. You can only write about a finished job. It would have been a useful means of warding off boredom though, but one did not do it for the fear that the authorities might seize the papers. However I had enough time to make detailed notes on what happened, and one might use them if in future there was any need to write something.  

Ejindu: Before you went into prison, the cloud was so clear above this country that one could see very far into the future. Now that you are out, what do you see?  

Nzeogwu: A job very badly done. If I may borrow your metaphor, the atmosphere is admittedly somewhat cloudy. But I don’t think there will be rain. Indeed if you look steadily up you will find that the sun is not yet set and might still peep through. The trouble is that people generally can’t tell which is a rain cloud and which is not, and as a result they tend to be confused. As you know there is too much bitterness at present in the country, and in the past people had imagined that they could conveniently do without one another. But the bitterness will clear in the end and they will find that they are not as self-reliant as they had thought. And they will long to be together…. The .same applies to the Northerners. It may take ten or fifteen years for them to come together again but there is no doubt, as far as I can see, that they will. You see, in this world of imperfection, it is sometimes very difficult to capture the ideal. But we can, at least start with the second best.  

Ejindu: What is the second best?  

Nzeogwu: A Confederation.  

Ejindu: Before I come back to that, may 1 take you back to January, 1966. What exactly happened at Nassarawa (the premier’s residence at Kaduna) on the night of the 14th?

Nzeogwu: No, no, no; don’t ask me anything about that, I don’t want to remember it.

Ejindu: All right. A lot has been talked and written about the January coup. But how tribalistic was it really in conception and execution?  

Nzeogwu: In the North, no. In the South, yes. We were five in number, and initially we knew quite clearly what we wanted to do. We had a short list of people who were either undesirable for the future progress of the country or who by their positions at the time had to be sacrificed for peace and stability. Tribal considerations were completely out of our minds at this stage. But we had a set-back in the execution. Both of us in the North did our best. But the other three who were stationed in the South failed because of incompetence and misguided considerations in the eleventh hour. The most senior among them was in charge of a whole brigade and had all the excuse and opportunity in the world to mobilize his troops anywhere, anyhow and any time. He did it badly. In Lagos, even allowing for one or two genuine mistakes, the job was badly done. The Mid-West was never a big problem. But in the East, our major target, nothing practically was done. He and the others let us down.  

Ejindu: You must have anticipated that Gen. Ironsi would let you down in the end. Why did you surrender to him the way you did?  

Nzeogwu: I was being sensible. The last thing we desired was unnecessary waste of life. If I had stuck to my guns there would have been a civil war, and as the official head of the Army, he would have split the loyalty of my men. Again, you must remember that the British and other foreigners were standing by to help him. Our purpose was to change our country and make it a place we could be proud to call our home, not to wage war.

Ejindu: It has been said that Gen. Ironsi set out to complete your job for you. Was there anything you did not like in his administration?  

Nzeogwu: Yes, everything. First he chose the wrong advisers for the work he halfheartedly set out to do. Most of them were either mediocre or absolutely unintelligent. Secondly, he was tribalistic in the appointment of his governors. Thirdly the Decree 34 was unnecessary, even silly in fact.

Ejindu: But you wanted a unitary government?  

Nzeogwu: No. Not a unitary government as such. We wanted to see a strong centre. We wanted to cut the country to small pieces, making the centre inevitably strong. We did not want to toy with power, which was what he did.  

Ejindu: Tell me, what do you think of him as a soldier?  

Nzeogwu: I am afraid I cannot tell you that. But I will say that as a person he was very well liked and as the Supreme Commander, his orders were promptly carried out.

Ejindu: If he joined the Army as a gunner, he must have progressed as a military strategist?  

Nzeogwu: Yes, if he had, he could have done so. But he actually joined the Army as a tally-clerk and was a clerk most of the time.

Ejindu: From the present chaos, what type of Nigeria do you envisage?  

Nzeogwu: In the first place, secession will be ill-advised, indeed impossible. Even if the East fights a war of secession and wins, it still cannot secede. Personally, I don’t like secession and if this country disintegrates, I shall pack up my things and go. In the present circumstances, confederation is the best answer as a temporary measure. In time, we shall have complete unity. Give this country a confederation and, believe me, in ten or fifteen years the young men will find it intolerable, and will get together to change it. And it is obvious we shall get a confederation or something near it. Nothing will stop that.  

Ejindu: Do you think there will be any war?  

Nzeogwu: No. Nobody wants to fight. The East which is best equipped and best prepared for war, does not want to attack anybody. The North cannot fight. And Lagos cannot fight now. If they had attacked the East in August or September, they would have had a walk-over. Today, I think they will be ill-advised to try.  

Ejindu: An Englishman said to me the other day that the best thing Ojukwu can do is to take over Lagos. Do you think he can do it even if he wanted to?  

Nzeogwu: Yes, I think the East is strong enough to do it if they want to. But it will serve no useful purpose. It can only serve to destroy life and property. You see, the effective power does not lie in Lagos but in Kaduna, and if you remove Gowon somebody else will take his place. If you capture the South against the North, all you can achieve is civil war, disintegration and border clashes.

Ejindu: Finally, let me come to the controversy over your release.  Much as it has been a popular action you have been released by the east government against the wish of the federal government.  What do you say to that?

Nzeogwu: All I can say is that I am happy and grateful to be out.  We feel grateful to the Nsukka students for their persistent demand, and to the boys in the barracks for their pressure on the authorities in the east. And to the Nigerian public in general for their concern over our welfare.

Video Archives on Nigeria’s Former Leaders

This is a nice selection of videos.  The first is a series of old clips from famous Nigerians, including one of the Sardauna of Sokoto Ahmadu Bello who speaks in an impeccable old school British accent.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8jvmwd5ZRRM&feature=related

These three videos are a run down of Nigeria’s leaders over the years starting from Abubakar Tafawa Balewa through to the current incumbent, President Yar’Adua.  Also click the “Nigeria’s Leaders” and “Nigeria’s Great Speeches” pages on this site if you want to see more regarding these personalities.

Part 1:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8ZuxTi344E8

Part 2:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k5q6AHQ3LHg&feature=related

Part 3:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ATgazc7YZDw&feature=related