NIGER DELTA MILITANTS: TERRORISTS OR FREEDOM FIGHTERS?

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZGMB9Z4t5Xc

The old adage states that “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.” In Nigeria’s Niger Delta the armed gangs who have mounted a years’ long armed campaign against the Nigerian federal government have so far been tagged “militants” despite a sustained campaign of vandalism against oil installations and kidnapping which has badly disrupted Nigeria ’s oil production and contributed to spiralling global oil prices.

Despite their activities, the armed gangs responsible for these attacks have not been dubbed “terrorists”. In today’s post September 11 dichotomy, being labelled a terrorist organisation is a death knell and would cripple their struggle. Perhaps the gangs have been able to avoid the terrorist yoke because there is genuine sympathy for their cause in Nigeria and abroad.

OIL, “BLACK GOLD” AND THE NIGER DELTA GRIEVANCES

While daily oil drilling and gas flaring causes oil spills which pollute their water supplies, kill their crops, poison their lungs, disrupt their daily life and stunt their children’s development, the residents of the Delta have little to show for the “black gold” and billions of dollars of oil revenue pumped from their lands. The spectacular sums of money derived from the Niger Delta are evident in the lavish six lane highways and skyscrapers in Abuja and Lagos that were built with the blood and sacrifice of Niger Delta lands and communities.

THE DERIVATION FORMULA

Under Nigeria ’s constitution, mineral resources (including oil) belong to the federal government. However the principle of derivation states that a certain percentage of oil revenues produced by a state is returned to the state from which the oil was obtained. This is meant to “compensate” the state from which the oil was obtained. When substantial amounts of oil first started being pumped in southern Nigeria in the late 1960s, 50% of revenues from oil were remitted back to the state of origin. However the increasingly powerful federal government and military regimes gradually decreased the derivation percentage until it fell to a miserly 2%. It was eventually raised to 13% by the time civilian democratic rule returned in 1999. The oil-producing states of Delta, Rivers, Bayelsa, and Akwa Ibom, received twice as much oil revenue as the other states of the federation. Yet those four states are no better off (and in many cases are worse off) than their counterparts elsewhere that survive on a fraction of the revenue.

THE DELTA: A HISTORY OF REVOLT AND INJUSTICE

Niger Delta agitation for a fairer distribution of oil revenues is nothing new. As far back as February 1966, a former police officer from the Delta named Jasper Adaka Boro was leading a rebellion on behalf of the Niger Delta. Boro recruited 40 men into an organisation known as the Niger Delta Volunteer Force. Boro gave his men training in the use of firearms and explosives in the creeks and bushes. On February 23, 1966 the men attacked a police station at Yenagoa, raided the armoury and kidnapped some officers including the police officer in command of the station. They also blew up oil pipelines, engaged the police in a gunfight and declared the Niger Delta an independent republic. The revolt was suppressed and Boro and his men were sentenced to death (the sentence was not carried out).

KEN SARO-WIWA AND MOSOP

In the 1990s Ken Saro-Wiwa attempted a more peaceful agitation for compensation for environmental damage caused by oil drilling and a greater slice of oil revenues. Saro-Wiwa’s charisma and appeal for greater autonomy struck a dangerous nerve with Nigeria’s then military regime which brooked no opposition and was hyper-sensitive to any threat or challenge (real and imagined) to its control of oil resources. Saro-Wiwa and his followers were sentenced to death by a Civil Disturbances Special Tribunal and hanged.

THE MODERN DAY STRUGGLE

With Nigeria returning to civilian democratic rule in 1999, the latent frustrations that were brutally suppressed by past military regimes were released as increasingly confident Niger Delta youths began an armed campaign and demand for greater control of the oil resources from their land.

Unlike armed resistance movements in other countries, the Niger Delta gangs are not one organization operating under a common leadership with unified ideology. There is no central chain of command like the IRA had or clearly defined political ideal. Rather the gangs are a loose eclectic mix of several aggrieved armed factions like the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force. The gangs’ modus operandi is reminiscent of other armed groups and guerrilla armies around the world. They operate and place themselves in the midst of heavily populated civilian areas, making it difficult to distinguish fighter and civilian. They also take advantage of their superior knowledge of dangerous and inhospitable home terrain.

Their shadowy nature is an asset and a hindrance. While their mystique makes their detection and suppression difficult for the Nigerian security forces, it has also made them faceless and prevented them from making political progress. They lack a single articulate spokesperson who can speak for their cause such as a Gerry Adams or Yasser Arafat. The multi-headed militant hydra is not easy for outsiders to understand. This is where they are in dangerous territory.

The gangs’ activities has brought the issue of the Niger Delta to the world’s attention and has made it a major political issue within Nigeria. However while the public are vaguely aware of the Niger Delta issue, the gangs have been abysmal at articulating their demands. The Delta militants have failed miserably to turn publicity gains into political gains. Several years into their campaign, the derivation formula remains pegged at 13% and there not nearer to achieving any of their objectives.

Despite the disruption to oil supplies, the Delta violence benefits the government in a financially perverse way. Continued attacks on oil installations by the militants disrupts the global oil market and drives prices higher. Higher oil prices equals more money for the federal government. The federal government is therefore able to sustain a localized low intensity conflict for years without an existential threat to Nigeria or its control over other areas of the country.

The hidden danger is that if the status quo does not change, the gangs will be tempted to become increasingly daring and amplify their violence. This could emerge by way of a spectacular mass casualty attack or by extending their operations to non-riverine areas and major population centres like Lagos and Abuja. Should they do so, the Nigerian army’s hands are tied. If they retaliate with massive force, they will incur heavy civilian casualties and exacerbate the crisis. The IRA and Palestinian groups used the intensification of violence as a political tool. Originally operating almost exclusively within Northern Ireland, the IRA took its bombing campaign to the streets of England in cities like Birmingham and London and in two separate failed attacks, nearly succeeded in assassinating the entire leadership of the English government. The Palestinians of Hamas and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades similarly decided to take their struggle from the alley ways of the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza into the streets of Israel . They carried out suicide bombings inside Israel as a way of bringing their grievances to the doorstep of every single Israeli.

The militants’ cause has also been hijacked by criminal gangs who kidnap the wives and infant children of civilian officials. Being tainted and associated with such elements makes the militants appear like bandits. The militants quite simply do not have enough firepower, numbers or political stroke to achieve their demands by armed struggle alone. Now that they have the federal government’s attention, they need to make the evolution that the ANC, IRA, and PLO made from armed rebels to political parties. The militants require a political wing and a skilled orator to present a human face for their struggle. If they rely on brawn alone…they will disappear like Boro and Saro-Wiwa.

Interview with Lamidi Adedibu

With Lamidi Adedibu passing away this week, a lot of column inches have been occupied discussing him.  Rather than add to the column inches, I thought site visitors might be interested to see this television interview with him.  Enjoy.

JUNE 12, 1993 ELECTION: FULL RESULTS

Since the 15^th anniversary of the landmark June 12, 1993 election just passed, I thought it was an opportune time to publish the full results of the election. On June 15, 1993 the National Electoral Commission (NEC) released the results from 14 states (including the Federal Capital Territory). The following day (June 16, 1993) the Abuja High Court ordered that further announcement of the results should be suspended. Here are the full results of the election:

STATE	NUMBER OF NRC VOTES	PERCENTAGE OF VOTES FOR NRC	NUMBER OF SDP VOTES	PERCENTAGE OF VOTES FOR SDP	TOTAL VOTES	WINNER
Abuja (FCT)*	18,313	47.84	19,968	52.16	256,500	ABIOLA
Abia*	151,227	58.96	105,273	41.04	334,490	TOFA
Adamawa	167,239	54.28	140,875	45.72	414,129	TOFA
Akwa Ibom*	199,342	48.14	214,787	51.86	371,288	ABIOLA
Anambra*	159,258	42.89	212,024	57.11	847,274	ABIOLA
Bauchi	524,836	60.73	339,339	39.27	406,132	TOFA
Benue	186,302	43.06	246,830	56.94	282,180	ABIOLA
Borno*	128,684	45.60	153,496	54.40	342,755	ABIOLA
Cross River	153,452	44.77	189,303	55.23	472,278	ABIOLA
Delta	145,001	30.70	327,277	69.30	308,979	ABIOLA
Edo*	103,572	33.52	205,407	66.48	427,190	ABIOLA
Enugu	284,050	51.91	263,101	48.09	349,902	TOFA
Imo	195,836	55.14	159,350	44.86	228,388	TOFA
Jigawa	89,836	39.33	138,552	60.67	726,573	ABIOLA
Kaduna*	356,860	47.80	389,713	52.20	324,428	ABIOLA
Kano*	154,809	47.72	169,619	52.28	442,176	ABIOLA
Katsina	271,077	61.30	171,162	38.70	286,974	TOFA
Kebbi	144,808	67.34	70,219	32.66	488,492	TOFA
Kogi*	265,732	54.40	222,760	45.60	352,479	TOFA
Kwara	80,209	22.78	272,270	77.24	1,033,397	ABIOLA
Lagos	149,432	14.46	883,865	85.54	357,787	ABIOLA
Niger*	221,437	61.90	136,350	38.10	484,971	TOFA
Ogun*	59,246	12.22	425,725	87.78	964,018	ABIOLA
Ondo	162,994	15.58	883,024	84.42	437,334	ABIOLA
Osun	72,068	16.48	365,266	83.52	641,799	ABIOLA
Oyo*	105,788	16.48	536,011	83.52	676,959	ABIOLA
Plateau*	259,394	38.32	417,565	61.68	1,026,824	ABIOLA
Rivers	640,973	63.37	370,578	36.63	469,986	TOFA
Sokoto	372,250	79.21	97,726	20.79	469,986	TOFA
Taraba	64,001	38.58	101,887	61.42	176,054	ABIOLA
Yobe	64,061	38.41	11,887	63.59	38,281	ABIOLA

*States in which results were released. The results were released in 14 states only.

Vote Breakdown and Analysis

Voter turnout was higher in the south than in the north. The Social Democratic Party (SDP) candidate Moshood Abiola received over 8 million votes, and won in 19 states and the Federal Capital Territory. The National Republican Convention (NRC) candidate Alhaji Bashir Tofa received over 6 million votes and won in 10 states only. Over 14 million people voted. Abiola won in Akwa Ibom, Anambra, Benue, Borno, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Kwara, Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun, Oyo, Plateau, Taraba, and Yobe states, and the Federal Capital Territory. Tofa won in Abia, Adamawa, Bauchi, Enugu, Imo, Katsina, Kebbi, Kogi, Niger, Rivers and Sokoto States.

Abiola’s victory was comprehensive as he won almost 60% of the total votes cast. Only in two states (Kebbi and Sokoto) did Abiola fail to obtain at least one-third of the votes. Abiola even defeated Tofa in Tofa’s home state of Kano.

Voting Patterns

Although the voting pattern has subsequently been cast as unprecedented in cutting across ethnic, religious and geographic patterns, the true picture is a little more subtle. It is true that Christians voted for Muslim candidates. However Christians had little choice in the matter as the Presidential candidates of both parties were Muslim. The SDP was led by two Muslims: Abiola, and his Muslim vice-presidential candidate Babagana Kingibe. The NRC was also led by a Muslim candidate: Alhaji Bashir Tofa. Although Tofa’s running mate was Christian, both Tofa and Kingibe were Kanuri Muslims. Hence the concept of Christians voting for Muslims was an in-built certainty as any vote necessarily had to be for a Muslim since both presidential candidates were Muslim. Additionally, voting patterns in the south-west were solidly ethnic as the overwhelming majority of votes cast were for Abiola. In the south-west mainly Yoruba states of Ogun, Ondo, Osun, and Oyo, Abiola scored crushing victories, and received over 80% of the votes in each of those states. He also received over 85% of the votes in Lagos state.

The Danjuma Interview

There have been a lot of requests for me to post the full text of Lt-General T.Y. Danjuma’s interview with the Nigerian Guardian regarding his role in the July 1966 coup and the arrest/death of the then Head of State Maj-Gen Aguiyi-Ironsi. Here is the interview….

SUNDAY GUARDIAN-17th february,2008

You were quoted as saying that your memoirs would be one grenade of a book, why?

You know; there are so many versions of some the critical events that took place over the years in which I was involved. Some of the versions are sanitized; some of them are slightly inaccurate, which I will endeavour to correct. And in correcting them, there will be a few explosions. You know what a grenade is- it explodes.
Unfortunately, for me, each time I pick up my notes and try to write, I have to relive some of those very tense periods and I am so worked up. So, what I have decided to do is oral history- tell the story to a writer who’ll record, transcribe and so on and the book will bear his name and mine.
Will you, in the book correct, for example, the many stories around the coup in Ibadan in 1966 and your alleged role in the killing of Aguiyi-Ironsi and Adekunle Fajuyi?

The interesting thing about the Ibadan coup where Ironsi was arrested is that the full story is already in print. If you take the book written on me by Lindsay Barrett, the account given there with General ( Yakubu ) Gowon’s biography written by Professor Isawa Eliaugu – if you read that part of the book, the account there of what happened – if you put them together, a lot of the grey areas will be clear.
Well, you still have to clear some speculations here concerning your role. It is said that you broke Ironsi’s famous swagger stick, which was thought to be his magic wand. Did you? Did your people drag Ironsi on the road? Did you take him to Iwo road and shoot him?
No, it is not true. What happened was that after we arrested him, I lost control. Remember that I was a complete stranger. I came from Lagos with Ironsi as a staff in the Army Headquarters attached to him. I stayed in the barracks with the Adjutant ( the Chief of Staff of the Commanding Officer ). I stayed with him in his single officer quarters. And it was there, that at one or two o’clock in the morning – I was in bed – when he came and knocked at my door. He said, “sir, do you know what has happened.” I said, “no”. he said there was some trouble in Abeokuta, who was an Igbo officer holding secret meeting with all the Igbo officers in the officers’ mess and our boys went and shot all of them.

Who are the “our boys?”

Northern soldiers. Remember, Igbos did the killings that took place in January (1966 ).
They killed non-Igbo senior Army officers. Only one Igbo officer the killed but Igbo wiped out almost all the senior non –Igbo officers. We rounded up all the people, who did the killings, because we all help Ironsi to abort the January coup. They were rounded up and put in jail, where they were being paid their full salary.

They had television, they had everything there despite being detained and nobody was talking about court marshalling them. Instead, the newspapers including the Daily Times, in fact Peter Enahoro, who was named Peter Pan; in his Sunday newspaper(wrote a column) to the effect that The boys being detained were national heroes. National heroes because they killed corrupt politicians! He didn’t say anything about Army officers…
they killed corrupt politicians and replaced them with lronsi whom we would call Iron-side Very insulting and in my own opinion, very provocative article! He was saying that those boys should be freed. Tension started building. Riots broke out in the North and it was because of the riots that broke out in the North that Ironsi started going round to talk to traditional rulers and the Army leaders. I was in his convoy.

We got to Ibadan. We had a meeting with traditional rulers and leaders of thought at the end of which everybody was asked to sing the National Anthem. We all sang the National Anthem. In the night, we had dinner and we came back. We dropped him (Ironsi) at Government House, and then went to the barracks to stay with the AdjutantThen, at one o’clock in the night (there was) gbam, gbam, gbam on my door. I said what happened. He (Adjutant) said there was some trouble in Abeokuta. I said what was it? He said the man on duty - duty officer - saw the Commanding Officer holding meetings in the officers’ mess … all the officer that attended that meeting were Igbos. They left out non-Igbo officers. The duty officer called one or two soldiers; they cocked their guns, went there and rounded up every body. They thought it was a joke. One of them had his staff machine gun by his side and he bent down and attempted to pick it up; they opened up on him and shot him down.

They sprayed everybody, killed everybody there and started tele phoning.
They rang Ibadan. It was then that this boy woke me up. This was what happened. The press had been calling for the release of the January coup plotters. Now, our boys had created an excuse for the release. After killing these people, it is a draw – they killed Army officers in Lagos and all overNigeria. Igbos did it. Now,Igbos had been killed in Abeokuta; that’d be the end of it. I said no. I asked the Adjutant, who was in a position to know, if the Supreme Commander - at that time lronsi was known as Supreme Commander - had been told? He said, no; he didn’ think so. I said okay; he
should get me some soldiers. He brought soldiers. I didn’t come to lbadan with combat dress. I had to borrow the combat dress of an officer about my size. It was an American combat dress. This officer had just come back from the US. You know, when you travel with the Head of state you have to dress decently, wear service dress and so on. So, I borrowed fatigue, wore it. In fact, I wore it over my pyjamas and left with the Adjutant. I said, “take me to Government House”. We got there. We asked soldiers who
were on duty to ground arms. They all grounded their arms. I told the Adjutant what to do. Soldiers grounded their arms; we disarmed them and armed the soldiers that we brought.

Meanwhile, the anti-tank gun (lronsi convoy) was there, the commander was there. The commander was from the garrison in Ibadan. We knew him; we told him. He said we should use the gun to blow down the building. I said no,There’s no need; the Head of State was there; we had to arrest him. We were there and waited. Any time anybody came out from the building, we arrested him. They removed their shoes and we asked them to sit down.

Why were you doing this?

We didn’t want any violence. we wanted to arrest him ( Ironsi ) alive and go and lock him up.we wanted to interrogate him, to find out the role he played in the coup ( January 1966 ); his stories didn’t add up about how he escaped from flagstaff House where he was staying at No.1,Glover (Ikoyi), and ended up in Ikeja.How it came about Njoku,who was supposed to have handed over the command of the largest garrison in lagos, which was then the Ikeja Garison, did not handover.Njoku was still in commandand he (Ironsi) went to join him. We were going to interrogate him about all those, or at least, that was what I thought we were
going to do.

So, every I told the soldiers to do or not to do,they obeyed until eventually, first, (Adekunle)Fajuyi (Millitary Governor of Western Region) came out of the building after he Waited… every time they sent somebody out of the building, nobody went back. So, Fajuyi Came down. As he came down the steps, I saluted-him-and said; “sir, you are under arrest; hands up’ He looked at me and called me, “Danjuma?” I said, “Sir, you are under arrest.”
He raised his hands, and came down. He said, “What do you want?” I said,
“we want to arrest you and we want to arrest the Head of State.”

He said,”and you are going out with him?” I said, “yes .. .”
And you were supposed to be on the Supreme Commander’s
entourage?

I was;I was there. I went to Ibadan with him. What do you mean by,”supposed to?”

Because you were now arresting…

Yes, I was arresting. He (Fajuyi) pleaded with me not to go up with armed men;that he was going to go up and call him (Ironsi) provided I guaranteed his safety. I gave him my guarantee: I said, “I guarantee your safety.”
He went there, and didn’t come down. So, I decided to climb up. As I climbed up the steps, armed soldiers followed me. I had a grenade in my hand. I didn’t have any arm. As I came, lronsi was sitted; Fajuyi was by his side.
I said, “Sir, you are under arrest.” And I gave him the order to stand up.
Reluctantly, Ironsi stood up. He used to carry a staff crocodile. He had it in his hand. They both came down. Fajuyi was still asking me about guaranteeing safety. I guaranteed his safety absolutely. So, we came out of the building down toward the car.

One of the soldiers said we shouldn’t allow him to carry his crocodile, that there’s juju. I said no; there’s nothing in it. He said he’d disappear if we allowed him to carry it. He started to stop and I told him to shut up. That was the time I lost control. The soldier batoned me and pushed me aside and took charge. To my greatest surprise, the Adjutant, who was, you know, these were his troops - I was a stranger,
they were obeying me because everything I did they liked; they liked what I was doing, but the moment I told them not to do some thing they didn’t like, they rejected - I expected the Adjutant, who was there, to intervene. He probably incited them. He said,”Yes, the soldier is right. This thing here (Ironsi’s crocodile) is his Zasa; it’s juju that will make him disappear.”
So, they took the thing from him, pushed me aside and bundled him and Fajuyi in a vehicle and drove away. It was six O’clock in the morning.
The front of the Government House was littered with people without shoes; people who had come to get ready to go. They asked every one of them to sit on the floor and they removed their shoes. They all sat, including the then Head of Service (Chief P Odumosu). I came down. They (soldiers) drove away.
There was nobody to tell these people to go; so they all sat there. It was I who said, what’re you people still doing here. Quietly, they realized they were free to go. They (soldiers) had driven away Fajuyi and Ironsi.

What of you?

I had to hitch a ride to go to the barracks. They left; there was no vehicle even for me to leave that place; they Just drove away, taking them away.So, I had to make my way back to the barracks. If you read Gowon’s book, it’s there. They named names , of the people who actually took Ironsi away.

Now, there are a lot of lies. I read some very funny lies told by Ironsi’s ADC whose life I saved. He was an Igbo officer from Abakaliki area, tall, a good-looking chap. After the war he came back, I saw him, we shook hands and I gave him some money.
I read his account. You know we captured a lot of literature in Enugu. The Igbos named his account, including what happened in Ibadan, and what happened in the North - as pogrom. I read all the accounts there. It was there that I saw the evidence given by this man in order to … he must have felt guilty, when his boss was arrested and taken away and he went away and he went home empty-handed, without anything even though he was his ADC and nothing happened to him. He had to tell a lie to justify how he came out with his limbs intact. He gave a long story of how he escaped, what happened and so on.

That man told a lot of the lies that gained currency. Ironsi had two ADCs. One of them was Col. Sani Bello and the other was this man. I prevailed on the soldiers not to do anything to anybody. We arranged even for him to escape, and go away. He went home and started telling lies. He told a lot of lies, which I read in the account he gave in Biafra. We had an inquiry. People came to give account and so on and so forth. Unfortunately, I didn’t keep it, but I remember that the stories that gained currency were from that man.

The Adjutant created the problem?.

He didn’t create the prob1em. The Igbos who killed our senior officers all over the place created the problem; they created the problem. They sowed the wind and reaped the problem; it wasn’t him (the Adjutant). They were reacting;they were avenging what happened in January. The July coup was a revenge coup.

What’s the name of the Adjutant?

Garba Paiko!
Was he a major?
Major! He was a Second Lieutenant.

You were his senior?

Oh yes! But when it comes to coup-making, there’s no rank. Coup is abandwagon of hierarchy. This was his unit. He knew the boys; I didn’t know them. But he knew me.He used me…

You’re lucky they didn’t mistake you for an Igbo.
Oh, easily! I was lighter in complexion than I am no. Many times, they took me for an Igbo.

So, he (Adjutant) didn’t create the problem?

I don’t think you people know what happened. What would you do when you went to bed and woke up and found that all the people from your area in the Army, innocent people were killed in their beds, some of them even with their wives - all done by Igbo officers? We bottled up this for six months from January to July. Then, the opportunity came for revenge.
In the Army, you are taught that when you are fired upon, you take cover and return fire. We didn’t return fire immedi¬ately. We gave Ironsi a chance to deal with the people who killed our seniors. He did not. Then foolish people like (Peter Pan) Enahoro were talking about national heroes ¬that people who did the killings were national heroes.
We couldn’t understand! If politicians were corrupt, why didn’t you confine yourself to killing politicians? If it was necessary that the Army should take over, why was it that this same Army should eliminate the cream of that Army and leave us With absolutely useless people, like Ironsi who was a desk-clerk Head of State? We couldn’t understand it. But we bottled this up till July and when the opportunity came, we decided to revenge. This is what happened…

People blame you for what happened in Ibadan, but as it is, the Adjutant more or less, instigated the soldiers..
Yes, this is what I suspect. My suspicion is borne out by the fact that he did not do what I would do if I were in his position. He (Adjutant) approved of what the boys did.

ARE NIGERIANS BEING UNFAIR TO OBASANJO?

What a difference a few years make. A decade ago, General Olusegun Obasanjo was hailed as a respected international elder statesman with goodwill at home and abroad. His return to politics has utterly tarnished his reputation and Nigerian newspapers are flooded with daily vitriolic attacks on his leadership, personality and private life. It seems that becoming President for a second time destroyed his legacy. What went wrong?

It seems that Nigerian leadership is a poisoned chalice. Each Nigerian leader is always welcomed with tremendous goodwill, but is usually savagely attacked and their legacy denigrated after leaving office. Prime Minister Balewa is not remembered as Nigeria’s humble golden voiced first independence leader. He is the forgotten Prime Minister that presided over a corrupt regime that was violently overthrown by the army. Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi’s role as the greatest African soldier of his generation is rarely mentioned. He is simply the forgotten leader who could not do anything right. General Gowon is not the magnanimous leader who led the country through its worst crisis and kept the country together after a brutal civil war. He is just another corrupt military dictator who stayed too long. Even the once reverred General Murtala Muhammed is now criticised for desroting civil service morale with his purges, and is often recalled as a “war criminal”. General Obasanjo’s role as the first Nigerian leader to voluntarily leave office is no longer remembered. President Shagari is remembered as a lame duck President that presided over a chaotic administration and who let his Transport Minister loot the treasury. Major-General Buhari is not a principled leader who tried to fight corruption and introduce sanity and discipline into public life. He is a heavy handed human rights abuser. General Babangida is the man who presided over the most painstakingly conducted presidential election in Nigeria’s history, then voided the results. Ernest Shonekan is a footnote. General Abacha was the man who took Nigeria to the depths of hell and ruined its international standing. The second coming of Obasanjo was not a welcome relief from decades of miliary misrule, but was the “worst” ruler in Nigeria’s history. How true? Has Nigeria ever had a good leader?

Have Nigerians been so brutalised by years of misrule that they reflexively criticise any leader? Nigerians are professional complainers when it comes to their leaders. Savage attacks on the country’s rulers in a national past-time. They have not been fair to Obasanjo in this regard. On both occasions that he has ruled Nigeria, Obasanjo has left the country in better shape than he found it. After he left office in 1979, each successive government after him was worse than the one preceding it. Then he bucked the trend when he returned to power in 1999. He inherited a broken, dispirited, bitter, bankrupt and ostracised country that was wrecked by years of misrule, military coups and looting.

Yet Obasanjo is blamed for problems he did not create and which he inherited. Little attention is paid to his accomplishments such as fighting corruption and at least elevating it to a national talking point. In the days of General Abacha, the General’s son was fond of using the Central Bank of Nigeria as a personal bank account and would withdraw raw cash from it. Before Obasanjo, no Nigerian public official had ever been prosecuted and convicted of corruption. Obasanjo’s drive against corruption claimed prominent scalps such as the Inspector-General of Police, and state governors. Such measures were unprecedented. His efforts to reduce corruption also led to Nigeria’s Paris Club debt being paid off, in the process making Nigeria the first African country to pay off its Paris Club debt. These debts it should be remembered, were incurred between 1980-1999 (the exact period of time between Obasanjo leaving office after his first stint as Head of State and returning to leadership nearly 20 years later).

Obasanjo also did something which no leader before him, military or civilian was courageous enough to do. He defanged the military, by retiring politicised officers and professional coup plotters who were responsible for the military coups that constantly stunted Nigerian democracy. Before leaving office and handing over to his successor President Yar’Adua, Obasanjo sarcastically noted the manner in which he is blamed for all of Nigeria’s problems, whether or not in fact he is responsible for them:

“Many of them blame Obasanjo, and like the man in the drama, even when his wife does not have a child, Obasanjo is to blame. And, if he wants only one child and his wife has multiple births, Obasanjo will be blamed. Those who blame someone else for their own inadequacies will want to substitute Obasanjo for Yar’Adua. But it doesn’t work because it’s only when you identify your own inadequacies and correct them that we would move forward.”

Site Updates: please note that the great speeches section has been updated with the speeches of (a) Gen Sani Abacha upon taking power in November 1993, and (b) Gen Abdulsalam Abubakar after the death of MKO Abiola in 1998

Can a Military Coup Ever Succeed Again in Nigeria?

Before getting into my latest site topic, please note that several sections of the site have been updated recently. The inaugural speeches of Babangida and Abacha have been added to the speeches section, as have the broadcasts by Phillip Effiong and Gowon’s “the dawn of national reconciliation” speeches which marked the end of the civil war. In the Biafra Videos section, I have uploaded 18 separate videos from the NTA’s documentary series on the civil war which features great interiviews with the protagonists like Gowon, Ojukwu, Haruna, Joe Achuzia, Shuwa, Innih, MD Yusuf, Ben Ochei, Conrad Nwawo and David Ejoor. Now, onto my latest topic…..

Decades of military coups and misrule turned the Nigerian army into the most thoroughly politicised army in the world (as at 1998). Some elements of the army were viewed as little more than armed political parties that could threaten the existence of any civilian government. Thus when Nigeria returned to civilian democratic rule in 1999, it was feared that it would only be a matter of time before the army found an excuse to abandon the barracks for another political rescue operation. In his outgoing speech in 1993, the then Chief of Army Staff Lt-General Salihu Ibrahim revealed how deep the rot was. Describing the Nigerian army as “an army of anything goes”, Ibrahim added:

“I hold the strong view that any military organisation that intends to remain professional and relevant to its calling ,has no business meddling in the political affairs of the country…It is an open secret that some officers openly preferred political appointments to regimental appointments, no matter the relevance of such appointments to their careers…we became an army where subordinate officers would not only be contemptuous of their superiors ,but would exhibit total disregard to legitimate instructions by such superiors…We created such a situation whereby we were operating mini-armies within the larger Nigerian army.”

The fear and threat of a military coup was very real, as since 1966, the military had tolerated civilian rule for only 4 years, and busied themselves with Machiavellian coups and counter-coups. These coups have almost always been carried out by the same group of soldiers. The young NCOs and Lieutenants that blasted Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi from power in 1966 became Colonels that overthrew his successor General Gowon in 1975, and they became the Brigadiers and Major-Generals that overthrew President Shagari on the last day of 1983. One of the aides of Obasanjo’s predecessor as Head of State General Abdulsalam Abubakar was quoted by the Guardian of London in 1998 as follows:

“Cadet officers now talk openly not of having the ambition to become a battalion commander but of what they would like to do when they become governors of a state. The politicisation of the military has gone too far.”

The military was so politically powerful at 1999 that the incumbent service chiefs of the army, navy and air force (Lt-General Ishaya Bamaiyi, Vice-Admiral Jubril Ayinla and Air Marshal Nsikak Eduok respectively) initially refused to retire when the army handed over to a democratic government in May 1999. Only after weeks of national debate were they persuaded to stand down.

Within one month of the restoration of democracy in 1999, the government drew up a list of all armed forces officers that had served in military governments for 6 months or more. All such officers (numbering over 100) were compulsorily retired. The retirements swept out a number of immensely powerful and wealthy officers who could have been sources of future political discontent and coup plots. The retired political officers included Major-General Patrick Aziza (who chaired the ‘coup’ tribunal that convicted Obasanjo and Shehu Musa Yar’Adua in 1995), Air Vice Marshal Idi Musa (accused of framing up Diya and co during the 1999 coup plot), former Abacha regime members Major-Generals Bashir Magashi, Abdullahi Mukhtar and Chris Garuba (former Commandant of the National War College), the former commander of the Brigade of Guards Brigadier Yakubu Muazu, the former Military Governor of Rivers State Colonel Dauda Musa Komo (who was instrumental in events leading up to the arrest and detention of Ken Saro-Wiwa), Major General John Mark Inienger (former ECOMOG commander), Air Vice Marshal Idi Musa (former head of the Defence Intelligence Agency who was accused by some of being one of those that framed Diya, Adisa and Olanrewaju in the 1997 coup plot against Abacha) and the popular and powerful former Military Governor of Lagos Brigadier Mohammed Marwa.

The 9 year period from 1999 till the present is the longest period of time in Nigeria’s history without a military coup. It is no coincidence that a coup failed to occur in the absence of the retired political officers. So has the military permanently weaned itself of its coup plotting habit? Major Hamza al-Mustapha was charged with a coup plot (which included an alleged attempt to assasinate President Obasanjo by firing a missile at his helicopter). There were very strong rumours of a coup during the early days of the Obasanjo government too. The then Chief of Army Staff Lt-Gen Victor Malu publicly went so far as to tell troops to summarily execute any soldier who went on air to make a “my fellow countrymen….” announcement. He said they should be shot “before they put the microphone down”. The fact that Malu felt the need to issue such a strong public warning convinced many that a coup plot had been detected.

The continual retirement and redeployment of military officers has ensured that they find it difficult to build critical support networks and political bases that are required for coups. Coups have succeeded in the past because of (a) the support of the civil populace (b) the lack of pro-democracy/human rights groups (c) the indifference of the international community. The June 12 crisis radically changed the Nigerian populace’s relationship with the military and a military coup in modern Nigeria would be met with massive civil opposition and sanctions from the international community. It would take civilian misrule of cataclysmic proportions for Nigerians to tolerate military rule ever again.

Nigerian Corruption: Back to its Old Ways?

In a previous post, I mentioned how former EFCC boss Nuhu Ribadu’s removal was a carefully orchestrated attempt to hamper the fight on corruption and to protect corrupt Governors.  (see: http://maxsiollun.wordpress.com/2008/01/14/ribadus-removal-i-smell-a-rat/)Well, lo and behold, only a few weeks after Ribadu’s posting to a course at the National Institutue of Policy and Strategic Studies, the charges against former Plateau State Governor Joshua Dariye have been dropped (the same Dariye that was arrested by police in London for money laundering).   Former Delta State Governor James Ibori has been granted bail, and bail conditions have been set for former Edo State Governor Lucky Igbinedon.  Once again, anti-corruption efforts in Nigeria are being derailed.

Incidentally, here is a photo of Ribadu at his NIPSS course.